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Abstract
Wireless communication standards and implementations have
a troubled history regarding security. Since most implemen-
tations and firmwares are closed-source, fuzzing remains
one of the main methods to uncover Remote Code Execu-
tion (RCE) vulnerabilities in deployed systems. Generic over-
the-air fuzzing suffers from several shortcomings, such as
constrained speed, limited repeatability, and restricted ability
to debug. In this paper, we present Frankenstein, a fuzzing
framework based on advanced firmware emulation, which
addresses these shortcomings. Frankenstein brings firmware
dumps “back to life”, and provides fuzzed input to the chip’s
virtual modem. The speed-up of our new fuzzing method
is sufficient to maintain interoperability with the attached
operating system, hence triggering realistic full-stack behav-
ior. We demonstrate the potential of Frankenstein by finding
three zero-click vulnerabilities in the Broadcom and Cypress
Bluetooth stack, which is used in most Apple devices, many
Samsung smartphones, the Raspberry Pis, and many others.
Given RCE on a Bluetooth chip, attackers may escalate
their privileges beyond the chip’s boundary. We uncover a
Wi-Fi/Bluetooth coexistence issue that crashes multiple oper-
ating system kernels and a design flaw in the Bluetooth 5.2
specification that allows link key extraction from the host.
Turning off Bluetooth will not fully disable the chip, making
it hard to defend against RCE attacks. Moreover, when test-
ing our chip-based vulnerabilities on those devices, we find
BlueFrag, a chip-independent Android RCE.
1 Introduction
Bluetooth is present in a lot of privacy-sensitive applications.
These include headsets that we share contacts with, smart-
watches, cars, medical devices, and all kinds of Internet of
Things (IoT) products. Around 4.4 billion Bluetooth-enabled
devices will be presumably shipped in 2020 alone, and annual
device shipments are growing [11].
The overall zero-click attack surface is comparably large.
For example, all Apple devices publicly expose connectable
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Generic Attribute (GATT) ser-
vices whenever Bluetooth is enabled—even without prior
pairing. Many devices have Bluetooth enabled by default, and
quite a number of them advertise their identity [46]. Despite
these identities being anonymous, an attacker might find inter-
esting targets near airports or office buildings. Vulnerabilities
are wormable, as most devices can initiate new connections.
In this work, we evaluate various attack vectors based on
RCE. We consider attacks that are either compliant with the
Bluetooth 5.2 specification [12], propagate into components
outside of the Bluetooth chip, or brick the Bluetooth hardware.
On Broadcom combo chips, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth run on sep-
arate Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) cores. As they share
the 2.4 GHz antenna, they need to agree on access through
coexistence mechanisms. Using coexistence, we escalate from
Bluetooth into Wi-Fi components, block these, and then force
reboot various devices, including the iPhone 11.
We gain Bluetooth zero-click RCE by systematically
fuzzing those parts of the Broadcom firmware that can be
reached prior to pairing. Cypress acquired parts of Broad-
com’s Bluetooth implementation in 2016 [17], and while both
stacks diverged since then, they remain fuzzable and vulner-
able using similar techniques. Emulation and fuzzing pro-
vide insights into an otherwise undocumented, proprietary
firmware. We provide a C programming environment to inter-
act with the firmware image that can test hypotheses on the
firmware and narrow down the relevant code paths. Our main
contributions are as follows:
• We design and implement the emulation framework
Frankenstein to execute large portions of the firmware,
including injection of raw wireless frames and interac-
tion with the host,
• find three zero-click chip vulnerabilities, two for classic
Bluetooth and one for BLE,
• find the BlueFrag RCE in Android,
• break the coexistence mechanism in Wi-Fi/Bluetooth
combo chips requiring a full device reboot to restore
functionality, with some devices kernel panicing,
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• uncover a design flaw in the Bluetooth 5.2 specifica-
tion [12] that allows attackers to extract link keys includ-
ing inactive connections, and
• showcase that users cannot turn off Bluetooth as a de-
fense on recent mobile operating systems, as the chip
reset is not specified properly.
Frankenstein is publicly available on GitHub. The provided
fuzzing examples for two Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures (CVEs) find these in a matter of seconds to a few
minutes. Firmware dumps of other popular wireless systems
are also good candidates to be analyzed with our solution. We
were able to confirm portability of Frankenstein by porting
it to another firmware, however, we cannot present further
examples due to non-disclosure agreements.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
attacks within Bluetooth stacks and clarifies the difference be-
tween the full-stack Frankenstein approach and existing wire-
less fuzzers. Section 3 showcases broader vulnerabilities and
attack concepts that apply to Bluetooth chips of all manufac-
turers, including new exploitation techniques we found. Sec-
tion 4 gives an overview of firmware and Bluetooth-specific
internals. Based on this, we explain how Frankenstein works
in Section 5. The identified RCEs are described in Section 6.
Applicability to other firmware and vulnerability patching are
discussed in Section 7. An overview of related work is given
in Section 8. Section 9 concludes our findings.
2 Motivation for Frankenstein
In the following, we put the motivation for Frankenstein in
a broader context. Thus, we explain the general attack paths
within Bluetooth stacks in Section 2.1. Then, we outline how
Frankenstein integrates into these stacks, how its full-stack
capability differentiates it from other fuzzers, as well as its
applicability to other firmware in Section 2.2.
More details about how to perform these attacks follow in
Section 3. A technical description of Frankenstein is provided
in Section 5. However, we recommend reading this motivation
to those who are not familiar with Bluetooth and wireless
fuzzing.
2.1 Bluetooth Attack Paths
Figure 1 shows the attacks uncovered with Frankenstein.
While all attacks can be launched over-the-air, their capa-
bilities and escalation strategies differ.
Operating System RCE The most severe attacks allow di-
rect access to the operating system. Depending on the operat-
ing system, the Bluetooth daemon runs with limited privileges;
thus, the attacker needs to escalate further. However, on most
operating systems, these limited privileges include accessing
files and contacts.
While vulnerabilities in the operating system are the most
severe, they are the easiest to patch. All they require is an
operating system update, as they are hardware-independent.
On-Chip RCE The firmware running on the Bluetooth
chip can be vulnerable as well. In general, it is easier to
exploit—the protection mechanisms of the Real-Time Oper-
ating System (RTOS) running on it and the chip’s hardware
are rudimentary compared to what modern operating systems
and architectures provide. An attacker with control over the
firmware can access data processed within the chip and per-
form specification-compliant requests to the operating system.
However, to also gain code execution on the operating system,
further vulnerabilities on the host stack are required.
Thus, despite high exploitability, full system compromise
requires additional escalation. Nonetheless, on-chip vulner-
abilities are a security risk that often remains unpatched as
security fixes require patches provided by the hardware ven-
dor that, in turn, are shipped with an operating system update.
Inter-Chip Escalation An attack path that excludes miti-
gation by the operating system is inter-chip escalation. On
Broadcom chips, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi run on two separate
ARM cores. However, to coordinate spectrum access by
means of coexistence mechanisms, they directly communicate
with each other without the operating system being involved
into this. Using inter-chip escalation, a Bluetooth RCE can
then escalate into Wi-Fi components.
Depending on the type of inter-chip escalation, this
communication channel exists in hardware and might be
unpatchable. Thus, the firmware running on both cores must
mitigate against this type of attack, and the operating system
drivers should take action where possible.
Within our work on Frankenstein, we uncover all these vulner-
ability types, as shown in Figure 1. The focus of Frankenstein
is to find on-chip RCE. We show that on-chip RCE can be
used to break confidentiality in a specification-compliant man-
ner by extracting the link keys used by Bluetooth encryption.
During attempts to trigger the Frankenstein vulnerabilities
over-the-air, one of our Proofs of Concept (PoCs) triggers
BlueFrag, an Android operating system RCE. Moreover, we
explore inter-chip escalations and find that we can crash the
Wi-Fi firmware, which, in turn, produces kernel panics on
Android and iOS.
2.2 Frankenstein
Frankenstein creates a physical device snapshot and then em-
ulates it in Quick Emulator (QEMU) to fuzz the full stack:
over-the-air data is provided by a virtual modem, the emulated
firmware implements thread and task switches to fuzz mul-
tiple handlers, and it attaches to a real Linux host. It utilizes
QEMU in user mode without further customizations.
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Figure 1: Bluetooth attacker model and Frankenstein integration.
Chip Integration and Emulation Firmware running on
a physical chip is difficult to access, monitor, and modify.
Broadcom provides vendor-specific commands that can be
used to extract firmware from the ROM. Moreover, the ROM
can be temporarily patched with breakpoints, the so-called
Patchram mechanism. The InternalBlue experimentation
framework enables ROM extraction and patching [35].
The Patchram mechanism and monitoring on the hardware
itself are very limited. Even with an over-the-air Software-
Defined Radio (SDR) fuzzer, which would require to re-
implement all the logic and formats defined in the 3256 pages
of the Bluetooth specification, analyzing the results would be
infeasible. Thus, Frankenstein fuzzes the firmware in emula-
tion. This provides higher speed than over-the-air fuzzing and
enables coverage feedback through QEMU.
Emulating a firmware dump comes with various challenges.
These include memory map generation, chip state extraction
including hardware registers, and working with only partial
symbols. The common approach to handle these challenges
is to reverse-engineer firmware in order to identify protocol
parsers that pose a potential zero-click attack surface. Then,
these specific protocol handlers can be manually analyzed or
automatically fuzzed. However, Frankenstein emulates and
fuzzes the firmware as a whole—including a virtual modem
for input generation and the ability to attach it to the Linux
BlueZ Bluetooth stack. Internally, this requires the implemen-
tation of interrupt handling and thread switches.
Instead of using the emulator for most of these tasks,
Frankenstein applies these features as C hooks within the
firmware. This enables running a selection of these hooks on
the physical chip, such as Frankenstein heap sanitizer.
Full-Stack Approach The virtual modem and the ability to
interact with an operating system mean that Frankenstein trig-
gers realistic full-stack behavior. For example, Frankenstein
generates various pairing dialogs on an Ubuntu desktop instal-
lation when fuzzing the Link Management Protocol (LMP).
In fact, we uncover one complex vulnerability during device
scanning, where the host asks for an Extended Inquiry Re-
sponse (EIR), and the over-the-air reply triggers the bug. The
EIR issue is triggered by a specification-compliant message
flow, meaning that it works on both Android and Linux hosts.
Frankenstein is not only faster than over-the-air fuzzing,
but our measurements show that it also provides significantly
higher hooking performance than the state-of-the-art Unicorn
engine [48]. This speedup is required for the full-stack ca-
pability. If the fuzzer is too slow and runs into timeouts of
the operating system driver or cannot handle interrupts and
thread switches properly, attaching it to a host is impossible.
In principle, Frankenstein could also be attached to other
operating systems that support running QEMU locally. As
of June 2020, we are working on adding further operating
systems.
Another, more complex application would be to replace the
virtual modem with an SDR. While this would only be pos-
sible with a high-speed variant that supports at least 80 MHz
bandwidth, this would result in a fully software-controllable
Bluetooth stack starting at the physical layer. Current SDR-
based Bluetooth implementations primarily support physical-
layer decoding but do not provide a full stack.
Portability The main focus of this paper is the emulation
of the CYW20735 Bluetooth evaluation board. This board
runs on an ARM Cortex M4 [19]. The underling RTOS is
ThreadX [22]. A more technical description of similar plat-
forms is provided in Section 7.1.
Frankenstein requires custom hooks inside the firmware.
Not accounting for Bluetooth-specific hooks, supporting in-
terrupts and thread switches on ARM with ThreadX are ap-
proximately 100 custom hooks.
As of June 2020, Frankenstein also partially supports the
CYW20819 evaluation board as well as the Samsung Galaxy
S10/S20 firmware. For the latter, no symbols are available at
all. However, symbols are required only for the hooks. The
emulation itself runs without symbols as it simply interprets
and executes binary code based on an initial state—thus, iden-
tifying all relevant functions is sufficient. Moreover, we used
Frankenstein for a non-public project that is not a Broadcom
or Cypress Bluetooth chip. Although this additional project
is non-public, we pushed all code changes that enable easier
integration of new projects to GitHub.
3 RCE-enabled Bluetooth Attacks
In this section, we present various novel attack scenarios en-
abled by on-chip Remote Code Execution (RCE). Details on
how we found and exploited on-chip RCE in the first place
are provided in Section 6. Our attacks are practical and apply
to the specification, a wide variety of operating systems, or
also affect the chips other than Broadcom.
A specification-compliant attack to extract link keys is de-
scribed in Section 3.1. Bluetooth capabilities are typically
combined with Wi-Fi within one chip, and with LTE on the
same smartphone. We exploit this fact to escalate into the
Wi-Fi chip component and cause kernel panics across various
smartphone models and outline how to lower LTE perfor-
mance in Section 3.2. An attacker might be able to brick
Bluetooth chips forever, as shown in Section 3.3. In general,
it is hard to defend against RCE, as turning off Bluetooth is
not guaranteed to reset the chip’s memory (see Section 3.4).
This section only discusses on-chip attacks and inter-chip
escalations, as these attacks have a potential lifetime of mul-
tiple operating system major releases. Escalations into the
operating system are highly platform-dependent and rather
short-lived. Nonetheless, such escalations pose a significant
threat, which has already been demonstrated as an attack
for the Broadcom Wi-Fi implementation [1, 5, 6]. Since the
iPhone XS, the Host Controller Interface (HCI) is attached via
Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe), exposing
similar escalation targets.
3.1 Link Key Extraction
During initial pairing between two devices, a link key is nego-
tiated. It will ensure the security of all follow-up connections
between the two paired devices. If the link key of a user’s
headset leaks, an attacker can listen to calls and access the
user’s phone book. Paired keyboards and mice can generate
arbitrary input or be eavesdropped. Smart Lock, introduced in
Android 5 and still present in Android 10 [30], enables users
to unlock their smartphone with nearby paired devices.
A Bluetooth implementation can either hold the link keys
within the controller or on the host. The Broadcom chip has
no permanent storage except the ROM. Thus, the host stores
link keys for all connections. According to the Bluetooth spec-
ification [12, p. 1948], the controller can ask the host for a link
key associated with a Media Access Control (MAC) address.
The host will send back different message types depending
on whether it has a link key for a requested MAC address.
This separation into two message types simplifies exploitation.
For example, an attacker can hook the reply function inside
the Broadcom chip to copy the link key to the global device
name variable. Reusing existing firmware functions makes
this patch require around 128 B in practice [16].
The ability of the controller to request any encryption key
differs a lot from other wireless standards. It is very specific
to Bluetooth, because the simple pairing concept of Trust
On First Use (TOFU) also means that there is no additional
verification by certificates or other external dependencies. In
contrast to existing attacks on pairing and key negotiation [2,
8], our link key extraction does not require an active Machine-
in-the-Middle (MITM) setup, but RCE.
Our tests on real devices showed that even the link key
for inactive connections could be requested. As a link key
extraction countermeasure, the host should only return link
keys if proper HCI messages were exchanged previously. For
example, BTstack only copies the link key if it has an active
connection [10]. Moreover, the stack should introduce a short
delay in link key request replies to prevent MAC address
brute-force attacks.
However, this attack can only be made harder, but cannot
be prevented completely while keeping the host’s implementa-
tion Bluetooth specification-compliant. As any proper mitiga-
tion would break compatibility with the current specification,
including the whole TOFU concept that enables Bluetooth
pairing without certificate checks, we did not report this issue
to the Bluetooth SIG but only to the vendors. In general, ven-
dors are aware of this—Apple even designed MagicPairing to
secure pairing of their proprietary Bluetooth peripherals and
integrate them into iCloud [27].
Table 1: Exploiting Wi-Fi through Bluetooth coexistence on combo chips (CVE-2019-15063).
Chip Device OS Build Date Address Value Effect
BCM4335C0 Nexus 5 Android 6.0.1 Dec 11 2012 0x650440,
0x650600
0x00 Disconnects from 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi can be re-
connected.
BCM4345B0 iPhone 6 iOS 12.4 Jul 15 2013 0x650000–
0x6507ff
Disables 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi until restarting Bluetooth.
BCM4345C0 Raspberry Pi 3+/4 Raspbian Buster Aug 19 2014 0x650000–
0x6507ff
Random Full and partial Wi-Fi crashes, including Secure Digital Input
Output (SDIO), ability to scan for Wi-Fis, speed reduction. Re-
boot required to restore functionality.
BCM4358A3 Nexus 6P Android 7.1.2 Oct 23 2014 0x650000–
0x6507ff
Disables all Wi-Fi until restarting Bluetooth.
BCM4358A3 Samsung Galaxy S6 Lineage OS 14.1 Oct 23 2014 0x650000–
0x6507ff
Disables all Wi-Fi until restarting Bluetooth.
BCM4345C1 iPhone SE iOS 12.4–13.3.1 Jan 27 2015 0x650200 0xff Kernel panic, resulting in a reboot.
BCM4355C0 iPhone 7 iOS 12.4–13.3.1 Sep 14 2015 0x650200 Kernel panic, resulting in a reboot.
BCM4347B0 Samsung Galaxy S8 Android 8.0.0 Jun 3 2016 0x650200 Disables 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi, kernel panic and reboot
when re-enabling Wi-Fi.
BCM4347B0 Samsung Galaxy S8 LineageOS 16.0 Jun 3 2016 0x650200 Temporarily disables 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi, freezes system
for a couple of seconds when re-enabling Wi-Fi.
BCM4347B1 iPhone 8/X/XR iOS 12.4–13.3.1 Oct 11 2016 0x650200 Kernel panic, resulting in a reboot.
BCM4375B1 Samsung Galaxy
S10/S10e/S10+
Android 9 Apr 13 2018 0x650200 Disables 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz Wi-Fi. Reboot required to re-
enable Wi-Fi.
BCM4377B3 MacBook Pro/Air
2019–2020
macOS
10.15.1–10.15.5
Feb 28 2018 0x650400 Kernel panic, resulting in a reboot.
BCM4378B1 iPhone 11 iOS 13.3 Oct 25 2018 0x650400 Kernel panic, resulting in a reboot.
3.2 Inter-Chip Escalation (CVE-2019-15063)
In the following, we analyze possibilities to escalate from
Bluetooth into further wireless components. This is possible
because Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are combined in the same chip,
and reside with LTE on the same smartphone. On Broadcom
Wi-Fi/Bluetooth combo chips, each protocol runs on a sepa-
rate ARM core, but they share parts of the transceiver. They
have a common interface to communicate their needs, which
we exploit to shut down Wi-Fi persistently. The operating
system cannot prevent this type of inter-chip escalation.
Coexistence between Bluetooth and Wi-Fi is usually re-
alized by applying an Adaptive Frequency Hopping (AFH)
channel map [12, p. 289], which can blacklist overlapping
2.4 GHz channels. Vendors can implement proprietary coex-
istence additions for better performance [12, p. 290]. Simply
blacklisting channels is not sufficient on Broadcom Bluetooth
combo chips—they add their own Enhanced Coexistence In-
terface (ECI) protocol. ECI optimizes priorities for different
types of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth packets. Each protocol stack
collaboratively waits for the other, depending on the scenario.
Our practical tests disabling coexistence confirm that
Broadcom combo chip performance highly depends on it.
When streaming a video and simultaneously listening to it
with Bluetooth headphones, the video stutters while the sound
is playing for a few seconds, and then the sound stops while
the video continues buffering. This means, as a countermea-
sure against attacks on coexistence, Broadcom cannot simply
disable it. 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi and Bluetooth would block each
other significantly, even without any attacker being present.
Coexistence implementations vary a lot between chips.
While there are different implementations, firmware compiled
between 2012 and 20181 map coexistence registers to the
same memory area. We crash or practically disable Wi-Fi by
writing to those registers via Bluetooth, as listed in Table 1. Of-
ten, it is impossible to re-enable Wi-Fi, and the device needs to
be rebooted to restore functionality. The Samsung Galaxy S8
stock ROM tries to re-enable Wi-Fi five times until rebooting
with a soft kernel panic. When installing a LineageOS 16.0 un-
official nightly build from August 30 2019, and performing the
same attack on the Samsung Galaxy S8, the log shows errors
related to WifiHAL. While LineageOS 16.0 does not reboot,
the screen is still freezing for a couple of seconds, then turns
off and leaves the user at the lock screen. We also observed a
kernel panic on the iPhone SE, 7, 8/X/XR, and 11 related to a
kernel mutex and AppleBCMWLANBusInterfacePCIe.
In general, coexistence can also be disabled in other ways,
such as ignoring callbacks with channel blacklistings or
packet transmission requests. The attack also works the other
way round—we produced a Wi-Fi firmware that never allows
Bluetooth to transmit on the Nexus 5 with Nexmon [41].
Coexistence for shared or co-located antennas is also an is-
sue across vendors. Various frequency bands of technologies
used within one device are likely to interfere with Bluetooth,
including LTE bands 40 and 7 uplink close to the 2.4 GHz
band. In addition to those direct neighbors, harmonics can also
interfere. Advanced measurement setups in shielded cham-
bers allow measuring the exact interference within a given
device [20].
Vendor-independent solutions enable coexistence between
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and LTE chips. The Bluetooth specification
1Chips require at least a year to appear in the wild, and this is the newest
firmware we had access to as of June 2020. The latest iPhone SE2, MacBook
Pro 2020, and Samsung Galaxy S20 all use firmware dating back to 2018.
outlines a generic Mobile Wireless Standards (MWS) scheme
for coexistence with both LTE and Wi-Fi [12, p. 3227ff].
Broadcom implements all MWS HCI commands the specifi-
cation proposes, along with vendor-specific additions. This
enables LTE coexistence with chips of different manufactur-
ers, such as Intel or Qualcomm. Since MWS coexistence is
coupled less tightly to the hardware than ECI, we assume
that tampering with MWS commands only leads to perfor-
mance degradation, but no kernel panics. Performance issues
highly depend on the chip-internal implementations as well as
physical aspects such as the frequency and antenna location.
Indeed, MWS is used on iPhones. The WirelessRadio
Managerd manages coexistence between LTE, Bluetooth, and
Wi-Fi. We can observe MWS messages on various iPhone
models. In contrast, we could not see any MWS messages on
the Samsung Galaxy S8 and S10e.
3.3 Bricking Hardware
At first sight, Broadcom’s memory layout seems unbrick-
able. Firmware is stored in ROM, and patches are temporar-
ily applied in Patchram. After a hard reset, all changes are
gone. Though, there is a Non-Volatile Random-Access Mem-
ory (NVRAM) section that should only be written during
manufacturing. It contains a per-device configuration like the
MAC address and crystal trimming information.
The WICED Studio documentation warns users about writ-
ing to NVRAM slots below 0x200. The WICED Hardware
Abstraction Layer (HAL) only accepts higher slots. An at-
tacker can skip this HAL safety mechanism and directly call
the nvram_write function. We did not want to brick our
Bluetooth devices, yet our experiments writing to NVRAM
bricked one Broadcom Wi-Fi evaluation board.
While it might still be possible to recover a device to a
non-bricked state, this requires system-level access to the
Bluetooth controller. On a smartphone, this implies either a
patch issued by the manufacturer or the user taking control
over the device to unbrick Bluetooth. The latter is an obsta-
cle on iPhones, which require to be jailbroken for this, and
Samsung devices, which flip the Knox bit once rooted.
3.4 Ineffective Defense: Disabling Bluetooth
On recent mobile operating systems, turning off Bluetooth via
the advanced settings menu will not turn the chip off. This is
counter-intuitive because active connections to other devices
are lost. We test RCE persistence by checking if memory is
reset and timers continue running. The underlying flaw is in
the Bluetooth specification, which allows a soft reset.
3.4.1 HCI Reset
According to the Bluetooth 5.2 specification, the HCI_Reset
command will not necessarily perform a hardware reset [12,
p. 2077]. On the CYW20735 evaluation board, only some
timers, current connections, link manager queues, and similar
information are reset. No full hardware reset is performed.
3.4.2 Testing Chip Hard Reset
We analyze if a device was appropriately reset. On Broadcom
and Cypress firmware, a bootcheck memory area is written
during a hard __reset of any device under test. We insert
custom values into this area. If they stay persistent, we know
that no hard reset took place. This approach excludes that
memory is persistent due to cold boot effects [47]. Moreover,
timer registers can be used to confirm the hardware state. We
issue HCI_Reset commands on chips ranging from 2012 to
2018. Indeed, the bootcheck memory area is never reset.
3.4.3 iOS Devices
On iOS 12 and 13 devices, including iOS 13.5, the Bluetooth
chip is neither hard reset when Bluetooth is disabled nor in
flight mode. Under some circumstances, like a firmware crash,
a hard reset can happen. When Bluetooth is disabled via the
settings menu, we can still connect to other devices when
issuing commands on the chip. Executing commands on the
chip and getting HCI events passed to the host for processing
connection establishments requires btwake to be active. We
believe this to not be a showstopper when facing RCE, since
it is implemented as interrupt on the firmware and can be
reconfigured. Communication with the host is not necessarily
required when adding functions inside the firmware to handle
over-the-air requests.
While Bluetooth is enabled on an iPhone, it can be found
using BLE device scanning. The MAC address is randomized,
but an attacker can connect and request the firmware version.
BLE advertisements contained a device name in iOS 12 [46],
which has been fixed in iOS 13. However, this anonymity does
not stop attackers, as Bluetooth requires proximate targets
either way. Moreover, Bluetooth has become an even more
integral part of iOS 13 due to features like Find My [3].
3.4.4 Android Devices
In contrast to iOS, Android 8 and 9 on a Samsung Galaxy
S8 as well as Android 9 and 10 on a Samsung Galaxy S10e
will disable and hard reset Bluetooth in flight mode. However,
when not in flight mode, the Bluetooth chip will not be reset by
turning off Bluetooth. The latest version we tested is Android
10 on the March 2020 patch level. This behavior does not
change when disabling location services. Whenever a user
turns off Bluetooth, only BLE and classic scanning for devices
are disabled. No HCI_Reset is issued. It is still possible to
connect to other devices.
Android 6 on a Nexus 5 resets memory contents and also
reloads the firmware patch file with each Bluetooth restart.
4 Proprietary Firmware Internals
Understanding firmware internals is essential to master emu-
lation and find on-chip RCE vulnerabilities. Figure 2 depicts
firmware internals, which we explain top-down in the follow-
ing. The details described in this section were discovered and
analyzed using the emulation techniques described later in
Section 5. Our analysis is based on the Cypress CYW20735
evaluation board and its firmware [18], which was shipped
with partial symbols in the WICED Studio 6.2 toolsuite [35].
For this firmware, no public documentation or source code is
available.
4.1 Interaction Between Host and Controller
In Bluetooth terminology, the host is the operating system, and
the controller is the chip running the firmware. A host com-
municates with the controller using the HCI. In the case of
the CYW20735 chip, HCI is sent via Universal Asynchronous
Receiver Transmitter (UART) to the host. Data is sent via the
same interface using Asynchronous Connection-Less (ACL)
and Synchronous Connection-Oriented (SCO) packets. Data
does not require any interpretation by the Link Manager (LM).
4.2 ThreadX
The firmware is based on ThreadX, a RTOS optimized for
embedded devices [22]. ThreadX implements threads, events,
queues, semaphores, and dynamic memory. The firmware
uses several threads, such as the LM, UART state machine,
and a special idle thread. Each thread implements a main
loop, waiting for events to be processed. When an event for a
waiting thread is created, a context switch is performed. Those
events are mainly used for inter-thread communication, i.e.,
pass an HCI packet from the LM to the UART state machine.
If all events are processed, the firmware enters an idle state. At
this point, new events are only generated by interrupts, such
as UART, the Bluetooth Core Scheduler (BCS), or timers.
4.3 Bluetooth Core Scheduler
The BCS is a separate component, handling time-critical Blue-
tooth events. The interrupt handler bluetoothCoreInt_C
calls it every 312.5 µs. This timing is the smallest unit of the
Bluetooth clock and corresponds to 1/2 slot length [12, p. 415].
The BCS kernel holds a pool of various tasks, whereas only a
single task can be active at any point in time. Tasks implement
ACL, device inquiry, paging, and more. They directly access
the hardware packet buffer and registers holding packet infor-
mation. For classic Bluetooth, which supports higher through-
put rates than BLE, the packet buffer is mapped into RAM
using a Direct Memory Access (DMA) mechanism. On re-
ception, the packet is copied to dynamic memory and handed
to the corresponding thread.
5 The Frankenstein Framework
We call our firmware emulation framework Frankenstein be-
cause it modifies a firmware image to bring it back to life in
a different environment. Snapshots of the state of the physi-
cal hardware during normal operation can be integrated and
ported to the emulated environment. In the following, we
showcase the capabilities of our approach on the CYW20735
Bluetooth controller. However, other firmwares are also sup-
ported. The emulated virtual Bluetooth chip can even be at-
tached to a sophisticated operating system like Linux, but in
principle also to other operating systems that support UART
Bluetooth, such as macOS. All steps to revive the CYW20735
firmware are explained in the following.
5.1 Bringing Firmware Images Back to Life
Emulation either requires firmware initialization or a clean
memory snapshot containing all registers. Memory snapshots
simplify the process for complex firmware. Initially, it might
be undocumented how memory is mapped. Thus, Franken-
stein comes with a map_memory hook that overwrites the
ARM memory fault handler and sweeps through the whole
address range. Once the memory map is known, a snapshot of
the memory is obtained from a physical device by executing
an xmit_state hook, which can be placed within arbitrary
functions. The xmit_state hook pauses interrupts and dis-
ables the watchdog while copying all memory via HCI, which
takes several minutes. Since snapshot hooks are placed within
functions, the snapshot state is comparably deterministic. For
example, snapshots can be taken while the chip has an active
connection within a selected protocol handler.
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Figure 2: Broadcom/Cypress Bluetooth firmware internals.
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to an executable ELF file.
We use an unmodified QEMU in user mode for emulation.
However, the snapshot is a raw binary without symbols. We re-
assemble it to an Executable and Linking Format (ELF) file,
as illustrated in Figure 3. User-defined code is then compiled
and linked against the firmware image. The compiled code is
stored in a separate page and provides the initial entry point
_start for the emulation. It shares the same address space
as the firmware, hence it can call functions and parse data
structures within the image. The syntax is equivalent to any C
code written for the firmware. It also adds new features and
makes modifications to substitute missing physical hardware.
Frankenstein runs in Linux user mode, which does not
support interrupts. Thus, we disable functions responsible for
enabling and disabling interrupts. Timing-related functions,
such as delay, use special purpose hardware and are also
replaced. ThreadX uses a Supervisor Call (SVC) to perform
a context switch between threads. On ARM this is a software
interrupt, with a handler located at a known location. As an
SVC has special calling conventions that cannot be emulated
in user-mode, we re-implemented the handler.
After these modifications, the firmware is executed until
the idle thread returns from the interrupt.2 We replace that
return address on the stack with a pointer to our own function.
Within this function, we can invoke interrupt handlers like
a normal function call to preserve the threading behavior.
Thereby, we can inject HCI traffic or Bluetooth frames, as
described in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5.
2On ARM, returning from exceptions is done by loading a special value
to the Program Counter (PC). The idle thread will return to 0xfffffffd,
showing that an interrupt invoked it.
5.2 Hooking for Portability
We implement a lightweight hooking mechanism that can be
used to modify the emulated firmware as well as the firmware
running on the device. Any code written in Frankenstein
can also be compiled for the firmware and injected like a
shellcode. Even though the firmware is in ROM, it can be
patched temporarily. Broadcom uses a Patchram mechanism
to do so [35]. Each Patchram slot contains a 4 B overlay in
ROM and can be used to branch to the actual patch. The
number of Patchram slots is very limited, but we use this
mechanism as it allows us to install patches on the virtual and
the physical firmware.
As the number of modifications to the ROM is limited
to 256 Patchram slots on the CYW20735 chip, we use a
trampoline-based approach, similar to the Nexmon hook patch
variant [41]. More advanced approaches like RetroWrite
that pose less overhead are completely infeasible, as they
rewrite the whole firmware and require position-independent
code [21]. Instead, we modify the prologue of the target func-
tion to branch to our code. Once our hook is executed, we
restore the original prologue and call the target function. On
return, we execute a post-hook function to reinstall the hook
and continue normal execution.
This hooking mechanism enables Frankenstein to trace
function calls and analyze interrupt handlers and the corre-
sponding status registers running on QEMU and the physical
device. It also supports writing PoCs for over-the-air firmware
vulnerabilities running on the physical hardware.
For example, a basic LMP protocol fuzzer requires the
following hooks:
1. context switches between threads,
2. Host Controller Interface (HCI) support,
3. hardware interrupt based timers, and
4. ∼100 hooks for debugging and implementation.
5.3 Heap Sanitizer Hook Performance
ThreadX has a custom implementation for dynamic memory
called BLOC buffer. Each BLOC is a continuous chunk of mem-
ory, divided into several chunks of equal size. Free chunks
are managed using a singly linked list.
The sanitizer iterates over the free list and validates that all
pointers are within the BLOC pool. Frankenstein hooks various
functions such as memcpy and dynamic_memory_Release
to integrate this check without further modifications to the
heap itself. Thus, the Frankenstein sanitizer can also be added
during runtime to the firmware running on the physical device.
Unicorn, which is the state-of-the-art firmware hooking
tool, allows setting callbacks for each executed basic block,
instruction, or memory access. It relies on external function
calls [48]. Since Frankenstein hooks are modifications to
the firmware itself, no external libraries are called. In addi-
tion, the Frankenstein hook payload is executed within the
instrumented firmware and implemented in C. Therefore, it
outperforms the Unicorn hooking mechanism.
We re-implement the same heap sanitizer with Unicorn
Python bindings for comparison and run it on a Thinkpad
T430 with an i5-3320M CPU. Figure 4 shows the results.
The baseline runtime of the instrumented firmware without
heap sanitizer is 24.8 ms on average. When sanitizing the
heap during LMP fuzzing, Frankenstein comes with a per-
formance overhead of 11.6 ms (46.8 %) on the mean average
compared to the baseline. The same implementation using
Unicorn increases the runtime by 145.2 ms (585.5 %) com-
pared to the baseline. Therefore, firmware instrumentation
using Frankenstein outperforms Unicorn by a factor of 12.5
in the heap sanitizer scenario. Performance of other use cases
varies depending on the number of hooks.
While the exact speedup depends on the scenario, it is
sufficient to overcome the break-even point for the full-stack
fuzzing use case. Frankenstein emulates the firmware fast
enough to enable interaction with an unmodified Bluetooth
stack on the host and, thus, attaching it to Linux BlueZ [13].
5.4 Talking to an Operating System
Attaching Frankenstein to an operating system Bluetooth im-
plementation enables full-stack fuzzing. For example, CVE-
2019-11516 (see Section 6.2) is triggered by the host asking
for additional information. On the physical device, HCI traffic
is sent to the host via UART. In the emulation, we connect
UART to a Linux host using a pseudo-terminal device [33].
Opening a Pseudo Terminal Master (PTM) creates a file de-
scriptor, used in the emulator via Linux read and write sys-
tem calls. The operating system then creates a corresponding
Pseudo Terminal Slave (PTS), which is similar to a virtual
serial interface. The PTS is then passed to btattach to attach
the emulator to the Linux BlueZ Bluetooth stack.
HCI events generated by the firmware are extracted by
hooking uart_SendAsynch. This function is a central com-
ponent of the transmit state machine and gets called for every
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Figure 4: Performance comparison of heap sanitizer with
Frankenstein and Unicorn hooks in LMP fuzzing.
HCI event. Those events are sent to the host using the write
system call. The opposite direction, injecting HCI commands,
requires two steps. We replace functions that read data from
UART packet buffers with read system calls and analyze the
status registers triggering the UART interrupt handler. This
will invoke the UART receive state machine implemented in
the bttransport thread. Note that ACL and SCO data traffic
is also passed over the UART interface.
5.5 Non-Wireless Wireless Packet Injection
The virtual modem calls the Bluetooth Core Scheduler (BCS)
interrupt handler and generates specific packets for these.
For most task types, the packets can be entirely random for
reaching maximum coverage. The Link Management Proto-
col (LMP) was fuzzed coverage-based due to the complexity
of the Link Manager (LM) state machine. The most interest-
ing fuzzing optimizations are as follows.
Paging This task accepts any connection attempt.
LMP The LM handles a lot of logic within the firmware and
is fuzzed coverage-based, as described in Section 5.6.
We have to analyze the calling convention of bluetooth
CoreInt_C to implement a virtual modem injecting custom
packets. On the device, it is important not to alter the 312.5 µs
timing at which bluetoothCoreInt_C is called. Hence, only
a limited number of debugging techniques can be used. We
hook this function on the physical device and dump the
hardware registers of interest to a ring buffer. Those are
mainly phy_status and sr_status, which control the BCS
kernel. phy_status controls which function is executed by
bluetoothCoreInt_C and depends on the Bluetooth clock.
An example of phy_status within an active ACL slave
connection is shown in Table 2. Prior to a reception in the
Slot11 interrupt, the receive buffer located in RAM is mapped
to the hardware receive buffer using DMA. This memory
overlay technique is used to prevent the use of memcpy and
therefore save CPU resources. Packet data is written to RAM
instead of writing it directly to the hardware receive buffer.
Within the receive header done interrupt, the packet header
is available. Besides, it is checked whether the remote device
acknowledged the previous transmission. If no retransmission
is required, the next packet is put into the ACL task storage for
transmission. Those LMP packets which the remote device
acknowledged are passed back to the LM for final processing.
Table 2: Calling convention for an ACL slave connection.
Bluetooth Clock phy_status
0b??00 Receive header done
0b??01 Receive done, Slot01 interrupt
0b??10 Transmit done
0b??11 Slot11 interrupt
Once the packet has been received, receive done is called.
The receive buffer is unmapped, and the packet is saved to the
ACL task storage. During the Slot01 interrupt, the hardware
is configured to transmit the next packet. In addition, the
received packet is handed to the corresponding thread. LMP
packets are passed to the LM thread. ACL packets are passed
to the bttransport thread. Transmit done will unmap the
transmit buffer. This process repeats with the Slot11 interrupt.
5.6 Code Coverage
We came up with a different representation for coverage-
guided fuzzing of protocols. Instead of handling all the input
data as a single Binary Large Object (BLOB), we represent
it as a sequence of packets, where packets and sequences are
mutated separately. This enables the fuzzer to reorder already
known packets to increase coverage. We start with a single se-
quence containing only one packet that consists of null-bytes.
For each execution, a random sequence is chosen from the
population and mutated. To distinguish the effect of mutating
sequences from mutating packets, only one of those is per-
formed per measurement. If the mutation of a single packet
increased the code coverage, the sequence containing the new
packet is added to the population. If mutating a sequence
increased the code coverage, it is also added to the population.
Sequence mutations are reordering packets, inserting known
packets from other sequences, or merging two sequences.
Both approaches were compared with the same set of mu-
tations over two million test cases, as shown in Figure 5. We
previously implemented this reference implementation [39].
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Figure 5: LMP fuzzing strategy comparison.
Table 3: Coverage increase by new zero-click attack surfaces.
Scenario Coverage
LMP fuzzing 2.76 %
LMP fuzzing with BlueZ HCI 0.56 %
Attach to stack hciconfig hci1 up 2.04 %
Attach to stack hcitool scan 0.59 %
Attach to stack hcitool cc 1.04 %
Attach to stack hcitool lescan 0.57 %
Attach to stack hcitool lecc 1.85 %
Total 9.40 %
Our adaptive approach finds more blocks in a shorter amount
of time. The total coverage for LMP fuzzing converges to
2.76 %. Introducing HCI support increases the coverage fur-
ther by 0.56 %, as HCI handlers and the UART receive state
machine are invoked.
We evaluate the total code coverage during LMP and BCS
task fuzzing. This was obtained by using QEMU with the
translate_block trace option. The total code coverage is
then loaded to IDA Lighthouse plugin [24] to determine the
percentage coverage shown in Table 3. Each row shows the
amount of new code reached using the described method.
The total code coverage we reached so far is 9.40 %. How-
ever, we only analyzed specific scenarios prior to pairing,
which enable potential zero-click attacks. This focus is rea-
sonable as the Patchram is limited and Broadcom will likely
not fix issues that require pairing. The code coverage reached
is comparable to the size of the related parts within the Blue-
tooth specification. For example, we reached 3.32 % code
coverage by fuzzing LMP, and the chapter containing LMP
in the specification is only 4.05 % of the total Bluetooth spec-
ification in pages [12, p. 567ff]. Also, Broadcom provides
vendor-specific additions and utilizes the ThreadX operating
system, which are not part of the specification.
As also shown in Table 3, coverage increases by attach-
ing the firmware to the host stack. This realistic behavior is
possible due to Frankenstein’s full-stack approach. Fuzzers
that do not implement thread switches and only focus on one
specific protocol handler cannot reach these protocol parts
by design. This includes CVE-2019-11516 that requires inter-
action between the BCS kernel and link manager. Moreover,
as Frankenstein includes host stack behavior, the identified
issues will likely reproduce on physical devices.
Coverage also offers further insights. Even with the partial
symbols, identifying relevant functions is complex. Simply
calling a function in emulation and observing the execution
can help to gain valuable high-level insights into the code.
For example, 420 functions end on Rx and potentially receive
data. Observing coverage enables us to determine which of
these functions are important and in which reception handler
context they are called.
5.7 Adding New Firmware
Apart from this use case described here, Frankenstein is also
capable of fully emulating firmware if no memory snapshot
is available but only the compiled firmware including debug
symbols. ELF is a common format of these images that can be
directly imported into Frankenstein. Without a memory snap-
shot, hardware initialization needs to be performed, which
is challenging in complex environments. In the use case not
described here we were able to set up a working emulation
within half a week, including support of buttons, Serial Pe-
ripheral Interface (SPI), and Controller Area Network (CAN)
interfaces of a smaller firmware.
Our workflow for integrating new firmware looks as fol-
lows. The firmware is executed until a fault—such as infinite
loop or illegal instruction–occurs. Then, we fix the root cause
of this. We add function tracing hooks to function calls that
seem to be relevant. Those function calls are displayed dur-
ing emulation to show the program flow. Prior to functions
or interrupt handlers, hardware registers and buffers can be
modified, e.g., using read. This includes clock values and
receive buffers of external hardware. Then, coverage-guided
fuzzing can be used to verify how the input is processed by
the firmware.
6 Fuzzing Results and Exploitation
This section describes the heap exploitation technique and
documents three heap overflows.
6.1 Heap Corruption
None of the observed devices implements any exploit miti-
gation, such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP) or Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). The memory allocator
described in Section 5.3 can be easily exploited. With a heap
overflow, an attacker can control a free list pointer to point to
any location. This pointer is treated as a valid BLOC buffer due
to repetitive allocations, as depicted in Figure 6. This leads
to a write-what-where gadget and allows for Remote Code
Execution (RCE). The technique has already been discussed
for the exploitation of Marvell Wi-Fi controllers, although it
was not used in the actual exploit [43].
6.2 Classic Bluetooth Device Scanning EIR
(CVE-2019-11516)
This section describes a heap overflow exploit in device in-
quiry, utilizing the full stack [12, p. 513]. As a device scans
for other devices, these can respond with an EIR. An EIR con-
tains additional information such as the device name, which
is copied into an HCI event to be displayed to the user to list
available devices for pairing. The EIR length is extracted from
the payload header and subject to the same physical-layer con-
straints such as data rate and maximum packet duration. Due
to these physical-layer restrictions, the firmware skips further
length checks prior to copying an EIR.
Figure 7 shows the ACL header format [12, p. 482]. The
packet length is followed by Reserved for Future Use (RFU)
bits, which should be set to zero. The firmware includes these
bits in the packet length. Non-zero RFU bits exceed the buffer
length of the HCI event.
The hardware buffer holding the payload is not restricted
to the payload length of the specific packet being parsed.
Even worse, it contains a duplicate of the packet payload, as
depicted in Figure 8. This makes memory located after the
original packet’s payload predictable.
We allocate three buffers in a row within the affected BLOC
pool to exploit this heap overflow with a write-what-where
gadget. This cannot be achieved using the EIR packets, as the
data rate is too low compared to the UART connection to the
host—the BLOC pool would be cleared faster than filled.
We exploit that the host issues an HCI_Remote_Name_
Request command when an unknown device connects [12,
p. 1815ff]. The returned HCI_Remote_Name_Request_
Complete event has the correct size to be allocated in the
affected BLOC pool. The attacker-controlled remote name is
read via LMP in multiple packets into that buffer. By omitting
the last packet and silently dropping the connection, the buffer
is kept for several seconds until a timeout occurs. Repeating
this process, we can write arbitrary memory, resulting in RCE.
The over-the-air PoC works on various devices, as listed
in Table 4. By overflowing the BLOC header with an invalid
address, the Bluetooth chip of the device under test crashes.
The PoC running on the CYW20735 evaluation board changes
the device name to the payload and MAC address to pretend to
be multiple physical devices. This method works well against
Android and Linux hosts.
Affected Corrupted Free Free
BLOC Struct Target
Overflow
(a) Layout immediately after a heap overflow.
Free (Head) Corrupted Free Free
BLOC Struct Target
(b) Layout after a heap overflow and a free of the affected buffer.
Figure 6: Effect of overflowing a free BLOC buffer.
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Figure 7: Payload header format for multi-slot ACL packets
and all EDR ACL packets.
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 ca fe ba be MAC address
be ef e0 04 c8 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b EIR
0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
cc cd ce cf d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 da db
dc dd de df f4 d6 41 9a 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b Duplicated
6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 7a 7b suffix
7c 7d 7e 7f 00 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Figure 8: Overflowing hardware buffer that allows control
over more bytes than the actual payload length.
Table 4: Devices vulnerable to CVE-2019-11516.
Chip Device Build Date Vuln
BCM20702 Thinkpad T430 < 2010? Yes
BCM4335C0 Nexus 5, Xperia Z3 Compact,
Samsung Galaxy Note 3, LG G4
Dec 11 2012 Yes
BCM4345B0 iPhone 6 (unfixed in iOS 12.4) Jul 15 2013 Yes
BCM4358A3 Samsung Galaxy S6, Nexus 6P Oct 23 2014 Yes
BCM4345C1 iPhone SE (prior iOS 12.4) Jan 27 2015 Yes
Unknown Samsung Galaxy A3 (2016) Unknown Yes
BCM20707 Fitbit Ionic Unknown Yes
BCM4347B0 Samsung Galaxy S8 Jun 3 2016 Yes
BCM4347B1 iPhone 8/X/XR (prior iOS 12.4) Oct 11 2016 Yes
BCM4357 Samsung Galaxy 9+/Note 9 Unknown Yes
CYW20735B1 Evaluation Board Jan 18 2018 Yes
BCM4375B1 Samsung Galaxy S10e/S10/S10+ Apr 13 2018 No
CYW20819A1 Evaluation Board May 22 2018 Yes
The Bluetooth stack on Apple devices does not allow for
multiple unauthenticated connections simultaneously and is
not covered by our PoC. We extracted ROM and Patchram
from jailbroken iOS 12.4 devices with InternalBlue and can
confirm that the iPhone SE, 7, and 8/X/XR received a patch in
August 2019 or earlier. On the iPhone 6, the vulnerability is
still unpatched, but all Patchram slots are already occupied.
Since Android needs to support a lot of different hardware,
and vendors need to apply individual fixes, patches take a
bit longer. A fix was issued on August 5 2019, and it took
Samsung until mid-September to roll out these patches for
their devices.
The EIR vulnerability requires users to scan for devices.
We were able to observe device scanning in practice, for
example, every few hours inside a residential accommodation.
However, we do not know which apps or user actions did
trigger device scanning. Some apps require frequent scanning.
Bhaskar et al. built a smartphone app used by law enforcement
that scans for credit card skimmers using classic Bluetooth [7].
In our observations, location services only use BLE device
scanning, but no classic device scanning.
6.3 Any BLE Packet (CVE-2019-13916)
This section describes a heap overflow in the reception of
Bluetooth Low Energy (LE) Protocol Data Units (PDUs).
In Bluetooth 4.2 the maximum PDU length was extended
from 20 B to 255 B. A PDU is stored in a special purpose
BLOC pool with a buffer size of 264 B, as shown in Figure 9.
Besides the PDU payload, the buffer also contains 12 B for
headers. Therefore, the buffer is 3 B too small to hold the
maximum total PDU length of 255 B. These 3 B are part of
the pointer to the next free BLOC buffer, as previously depicted
in Figure 6.
However, the fourth overflowing byte is determined by the
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and also copied. It is stored
in the receive buffer, despite previously being validated in
hardware. An attacker has to adapt the payload, including the
Table 5: Devices vulnerable to CVE-2019-13916.
Chip Device Build Date Vuln
< Bluetooth 4.2 — < 2014 No
BCM4345C0 Raspberry Pi 3+/4 Aug 19 2014 Yes
BCM4347B0 Samsung Galaxy S8 Jun 3 2016 Yes
CYW20719B1 Evaluation Board Jan 17 2017 Yes
CYW20735B1 Evaluation Board Jan 18 2018 Yes
BCM4375B1 Samsung Galaxy S10e/S10/S10+ Apr 13 2018 Crash
CYW20819A1 Evaluation Board May 22 2018 Yes
BLOC Buffer Pointer
264 B 4 B
Packet Packet Data Unit (PDU) CRC
12 B 252 B 3 B 1 2 B
Figure 9: BLE PDU violating a BLOC buffer.
CRC, to take control over the heap. The initial CRC state is
randomized for each connection. Malicious packets with a
chosen CRC need to be produced within the tight Bluetooth
clock to prevent connection termination. The attacker can
pre-calculate the header and first 248 B payload. The payload
can be static for this attack. The next 4 B payload are used
to adjust the CRC. After this, 3 B of the BLOC buffer header
are inserted. These are followed by the chosen CRC, which
manipulates the remaining 1 B of the header.
Our current PoC works over-the-air, but only allocates two
BLOC buffers at once by sending a fragmented GATT notifica-
tion within one BLE event. One additional buffer allocation
is needed to gain RCE with a write-what-where gadget. Since
the affected BLOC buffer is one of the largest, we assume that
there is a standard-compliant way to execute this attack, i.e.,
using the 1M or 2M PHY modes. Table 5 shows a list of
tested devices, which was validated with the partial PoC and
local buffer debugging on the device using InternalBlue.
Interestingly, the Samsung Galaxy S10e is differently af-
fected by exactly the same heap corruption. Bluetooth crashes
over-the-air with our PoC because a new heap check was
introduced. It checks for overflows by saving the Link Regis-
ter (LR) and a static 1 B canary at the end of each BLOC buffer
element. If the check fails, it crashes gracefully. When this
happens, only one heap element is allocated, and we could
not deploy a write-what-where gadget. The heap check pro-
tects from RCE with CVE-2019-13916 despite the bug still
being present. We were able to produce correct data for the
heap check, which already requires all 4 B of our overflow.
To control the next element header, an 8 B overflow would be
required. Such a new RCE might be found by either patching
CVE-2019-13916 manually on the CYW20735 firmware and
continue fuzzing with Frankenstein or by porting it to the
non-vulnerable Samsung Galaxy S10e firmware.
As we did not provide a full PoC and Patchram is limited,
CVE-2019-13916 has not been fixed on any RCE exploitable
device to the best of our knowledge, despite reporting it in
July 2019.
Figure 10: LMP fuzzing results on Ubuntu with BlueZ.
6.4 Any ACL Packet (CVE-2019-18614)
Within classic Bluetooth, Asynchronous Connection-Less
(ACL) mode is used for data transfer, such as tethering or
music streaming. Similar to HCI, it is sent to the host using
UART, but with a different data prefix.
Upon driver initialization by the operating system, the Blue-
tooth chip signals the maximum packet and buffer size using
the HCI_Read_Buffer_Size command [12, p. 795]. Broad-
com chips are configured for an ACL length of 1021 B and 8
packets. If this buffer is exceeded, this causes a heap overflow.
It is important to note that this overflow cannot be exploited
without bypassing the driver and operating system Bluetooth
stack, which requires privileged access either way.
Yet, on the CYW20735 chip only, there is a buffer mis-
configuration that makes ACL exploitable. The global vari-
ables BT_ACL_HOST_TO_DEVICE_DEFAULT_SIZE and BT_
ACL_DEVICE_TO_HOST_DEFAULT_SIZE are set to 384 B,
while the chip still signals a size of 1021 B to the host. Thus,
just setting up a regular headset for audio streaming as a user
immediately results in a heap overflow. As the misconfigu-
ration affects both directions, the heap overflow can also be
triggered over-the-air by sending a few L2Ping packets ex-
ceeding 384 B. When reconfiguring the buffer size in WICED
Studio 6.2, this bricks the board’s capability of flashing new
firmware.
This vulnerability stopped us from further ACL fuzzing
with the emulated CYW20735 firmware. It is impossible to
take a snapshot during music streaming or tethering before
the firmware crashes. However, the CYW20819 firmware does
not have this issue—and Frankenstein is almost completely
ported to this newer firmware as of June 2020.
Mutator ./lmp_fuzz HCI Cache
./hci_oracleBlueZ
Coverage
LMP HCI/TCP
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Figure 11: Testing of emulated LMP fuzzing against the Linux
BlueZ Bluetooth stack.
6.5 BlueFrag (CVE-2020-0022)
Nonetheless, we tried to create a PoC for CVE-2019-18614
based on the assumption that a chip might cache ACL packets
if sent using Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
(L2CAP) fragments. Instead of crashing the chip, it crashed
within bluetoothd of an up-to-date Samsung Galaxy S10e as
of November 2019. After the report, which contained a PoC
including a Control Flow Integrity (CFI) bypass to create a
reverse shell using Bluetooth within 2 min, this was fixed in
the Android February 2020 patches as CVE-2020-0022. The
details of this are covered in our blog post [40].
6.6 Link Management Protocol State Failures
The Link Management Protocol (LMP) in classic Bluetooth
is managing connection and encryption setup. The protocol
itself is rather simple. However, the most recent attacks af-
fecting a large fraction of Bluetooth devices were located in
the LM logic [2, 8]. Each packet type has a fixed length, with
the maximum length being 17 B [12, p. 679].
We attach the emulated firmware to a Linux host to sys-
tematically test LMP with Frankenstein, as depicted in Fig-
ure 11. The firmware processes LMP packets generated by
coverage-guided fuzzing, which in turn causes valid HCI
events. A cache answers known event sequences, and un-
known sequences are forwarded to the Linux BlueZ host im-
plementation. This differs from code coverage based tools
like syzkaller [31], because only valid management-related
events are passed to the host. Moreover, we aim at increasing
coverage within the firmware and not within the host.
This interplay with a real system generates various interest-
ing outputs, as depicted in Figure 10. The user interface shows
a lot of weird pairing requests. We even observed faults that
produced dmesg error outputs and one system freeze. How-
ever, they were hard to debug in practice, and we were not
able to file specific bug reports.
7 Discussion
This section discusses Frankenstein and patching of discov-
ered vulnerabilities on a broader scope. Section 7.1 pro-
vides an overview of other firmwares that could be fuzzed
with Frankenstein. We show the current state of Broadcom
firmware patches on multiple generations of devices in Sec-
tion 7.2. Mitigation techniques against our attacks are dis-
cussed in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4.
7.1 Applicability to Other Systems
The general idea of emulating firmware to facilitate wireless
fuzzing can also be applied to other chips. An emulator similar
to QEMU and a basic understanding of the firmware binary
are required, though.
Our emulation framework is tailored to ARM chips and
ThreadX. ThreadX is the number one RTOS, which runs on
over 6.2 billion devices and provides multiple ARM imple-
mentations [22]. Wireless firmware designed for this combi-
nation is wide-spread. The other firmware that we internally
ported for Frankenstein is ARM-based and does not use any
operating system at all.
In the following, we provide an overview of wireless
firmware based on similar technologies. We assume that more
similar wireless platforms exist, however, confirming this re-
quires an extensive analysis of the respective firmware bina-
ries. Due to the popularity of ARM and ThreadX, we assume
that there are further Frankenstein targets.
A platform that uses ARM and ThreadX and implements
a wireless standard is Marvell Avastar Wi-Fi [43]. More-
over, the Huawei baseband, as well as the Shannon base-
band in Samsung smartphones, are ARM-based [14]. Broad-
com’s Wi-Fi chips are ARM-based, but the operating sys-
tem is HNDRTE [6]. We took a deeper look into the Rasp-
berry Pi 3+/4 and Samsung Galaxy S9 Wi-Fi firmware and
compared them to the Bluetooth firmware with known sym-
bols. We found that the main function in Wi-Fi and Blue-
tooth calls _tx_initialize_kernel_enter. Thus, both
Broadcom wireless stacks use ThreadX for threading, timers,
and events. Yet, Wi-Fi uses HNDRTE functions instead of
ThreadX functions for memory management.
7.2 Patching Bluetooth Vulnerabilities
Broadcom Bluetooth chips are released with a fixed ROM
image. Patches are applied using a special Patchram mech-
anism [35]. Each Patchram slot is temporarily stored in a
remapped RAM section and consists of 4 B. This is sufficient
to insert a branch instruction to code stored in a regular RAM
section. The operating system applies device-specific patches
during driver initialization.
Depending on the chip, there can be 128 or 256 Patchram
slots. This increasing number shows the need to be able to
apply more patches. Analysis of operating system patches
reveals that 256 Patchram slots are by far not sufficient. An
overview is shown in Table 6. Moreover, the RAM area con-
taining the code each patch jumps into is limited. Overall,
even recently released devices only allow for a few more
patches. Manufacturers like Apple, who support devices for
multiple years, cannot include all patches. For example, CVE-
2019-11516 was fixed in iOS 12.4 on all devices except the
iPhone 6, which already uses all Patchram slots.
Broadcom claimed CVE-2019-13916 would not be an is-
sue despite producing a heap overflow. Thus, we assume
that Broadcom only ships security updates for issues that
are publicly known and that they consider exploitable. The
limited Patchram slots force them into this decision. To this
end, expanding the Frankenstein fuzz cases beyond zero-click
attacks would likely result in further issues that Broadcom
would decide not to patch.
When initially finding CVE-2019-11516, it was exploitable
on any Broadcom chip we tested. Surprisingly, during respon-
sible disclosure, Broadcom stated that they knew about the
issue since February 2018. We could confirm this because the
Samsung Galaxy S10e ROM contains a fix and has a com-
pile date of April 2018. Interestingly, the most recent Cypress
evaluation board CYW20819 with firmware from May 2018
does not contain a fix.
Device manufacturers need to trust Broadcom to include
proper patches. One of the device manufacturers claimed
that Broadcom assured them the devices had been patched,
despite being vulnerable in our tests. Dissecting and confirm-
ing patches at large scale is very hard for anyone besides
Broadcom. Binary diffing tools perform poorly on raw ARM
binaries, as correct function identification due to duplicate
meanings in Thumb mode at 2 B offsets is challenging [23].
Advanced graph analysis methods fail on this firmware be-
cause state-of-the-art disassemblers miss a significant amount
of functions, thus, corrupting call graphs. Despite only dif-
fering in ARM Cortex M3 versus M4, having comparable
compiler options, and similar hardware register locations, less
than 6 % of the functions could be identified in practice be-
tween the Nexus 5 firmware and the CYW20735 evaluation
board firmware using BinDiff [35].
Table 6: Patchram slots used on various Broadcom devices.
Chip Device OS Slots
BCM4345B0 iPhone 6 iOS 12.4 128/128
BCM4345C0 Raspberry Pi 3+/4 Raspbian Buster 128/128
BCM4345C1 iPhone SE iOS 12.4 127/128
BCM4347B0 Samsung Galaxy S8 Android 9 254/256
BCM4347B1 iPhone 8/X/XR iOS 13.4.1 240/256
BCM4375B1 Samsung Galaxy S10/S10+ Android 9 212/256
7.3 Memory Protection in Broadcom Chips
Broadcom announced the introduction of critical area access
memory protection to prevent attacks like CVE-2019-15063.
The idea is that special purpose registers, such as those for co-
existence, can only be configured during device initialization
and are locked afterward. Despite reporting CVE-2019-15063
in August 2019, we did not see critical area access as a patch
in any firmware as of February 2020. We assume that this
feature is infeasible because the underlying ARM chip is a
Cortex M3 on chips prior to 2016 and a Cortex M4 on newer
chips [23], neither of which support such a feature.
After further questions to the Broadcom security team about
how and when critical area access will be applied, we finally
saw something potentially related to this feature in iOS 13.4.1
and the March 2020 Samsung Android release. Instead of pro-
tecting memory at the chip-level, the HCI commands to read
and write memory are restricted, including the undocumented
super duper peek poke command. After driver initialization,
these commands are blocked. While this helps against misus-
ing bluetoothd to block the Wi-Fi chip causing Denial of
Service (DoS), it does not protect from over-the-air RCE on
the Bluetooth chip and further escalation into the Wi-Fi chip.
7.4 Heap Management in ThreadX
CVE-2019-11516, CVE-2019-13916, and CVE-2019-18614
exploit the heap structure in the underlying operating sys-
tem. Patching this would secure 6.2 billion systems running
ThreadX. We proposed Express Logic to integrate a heap
sanitizer. As the BLOC structure contains fixed sizes, these
checks run in constant time and could have fully mitigated
our exploit technique and helped developers to detect vulnera-
bilities. They responded that we are not the first to exploit the
ThreadX heap—a similar attack was published a few months
before against Marvell Avastar Wi-Fi chips [43]. Nonethe-
less, they do not plan to integrate any mitigation, stating that
applications are responsible for secure heap access.
Despite this statement, the Samsung Galaxy S10e performs
a very basic heap check. We do not know whether Broadcom
or Express Logic introduced it. Crafting valid payloads is pos-
sible with the new check, but the payload needs to be adapted
for each firmware version. This is already a requirement for
all attacks that rely on calling functions and do not only write
to special hardware registers.
8 Related Work
In the following, we summarize existing work on wireless
chip exploitation as well as Bluetooth fuzzing.
To the best of our knowledge, publicly available work
on Bluetooth fuzzing only covers host implementations.
Firmware has not been extensively fuzzed or systematically
tested. Vendors might have non-public testing mechanisms.
Yet, the previously listed findings in wireless firmware show
that vendors do not have sufficient techniques to prevent heap
and buffer overflows.
So far, Bluetooth firmware research has been limited to
extend chip functionality. btlejack builds on the documented
Nordic Semiconductor BLE firmware [15]. It supports pas-
sive and active MITM attacks including BLE 5 hopping. In
contrast, InternalBlue is based on reverse-engineered Broad-
com chips [35]. While it does not support MITM attacks, it
can read and modify lower layer packets for both BLE and
classic Bluetooth. During the implementation of InternalBlue,
the authors manually detected a security issue on various
Broadcom chips. Despite the existing works on Nordic Semi-
conductor and Broadcom firmware, there has not been any
public, systematic security testing on these chips.
An over-the-air fuzzing on top of HCI was implemented
in [37]. This black-box testing approach only detects crashes.
These crashes might happen in the firmware, however, due to
the implementation focusing on host layer protocols, crashes
are most likely to happen in the operating system. The remain-
ing fuzzing implementations focus on the driver and operating
system level and do not involve any over-the-air packets. For
example, syzkaller supports fuzzing HCI on Linux [31].
Moreover, kAFL and its successors support fuzzing the Linux
kernel [9,42]. Implementation faults in operating system com-
ponents handling Bluetooth can lead to RCE across various
operating systems, as the Blueborne attacks demonstrated [4].
Such—even wormable—escalations still exist in recent im-
plementations as CVE-2020-0022 alias BlueFrag shows [40].
Broadcom’s Wi-Fi chips were initially exploited in 2017 by
two independent research teams [5, 6]. Heap exploitation was
documented in [6], however, the heap is structured differently
in the HNDRTE operating system. Recently, new Broadcom
Wi-Fi vulnerabilities have been revealed [1].
Other chipsets were also successfully exploited. The Mar-
vell Avastar Wi-Fi uses similar technologies as Broadcom
and had comparable heap vulnerabilities [43]. The author was
using afl-unicorn for fuzzing [49], but did neither docu-
ment the precise setup nor publish any source code. The Intel
LTE stack is based on x86, and was successfully exploited
despite memory protection mechanisms [26]. Moreover, the
MediaTek baseband exists in an ARM and a MIPS variant and
both were fuzzed based on the emulation of security-relevant
protocol handlers [34, 36]. Qualcomm is using their own ar-
chitecture and assembly for Digital Signal Processing (DSP),
Hexagon, and implements various memory protection mech-
anisms as well as secure boot. Nonetheless, an over-the-air
Wi-Fi buffer overflow exploit that escalates into the Linux
kernel driver’s memory allocation was found [25]. Security
analysis of the Wi-Fi firmware was done manually.
In general, emulation-based fuzzing is also supported by
TriforceAFL [29]. However, TriforceAFL does not use QEMU
user-mode emulation like Frankenstein but full-system em-
ulation. Instead of adding hooks to the firmware, it modifies
QEMU.
In contrast to static program analysis and emulation-based
fuzzing, LTEFuzz performs over-the-air analysis on LTE and
found vulnerabilities in various mobile devices and core net-
work components [32]. Moreover, SpikerXG wirelessly fuzzes
2G on multiple smartphones in parallel, including a packet
mutator using YateBTS [28, 45]. Such approaches are feasible
for 2G and LTE, because open source projects like OpenAir-
Interface and srsLTE already implement a lot of common
protocol features on SDRs [38, 44]. For Bluetooth, there is
currently no comparable implementation. Moreover, over-the-
air analysis is often unable to determine the precise causes of
crashes.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate several security problems orig-
inating from Bluetooth RCE—ranging from issues with the
Bluetooth specification to broken driver implementations in
various operating systems. Our findings unveil the possibility
to escalate beyond the Bluetooth circuit boundaries: attackers
may take control of the chip over-the-air and, from there, start
disturbing Wi-Fi and LTE communications or even crash the
entire smartphone.
We create Frankenstein, a tool for non-wireless fuzzing of
wireless firmware in an emulated environment. Frankenstein
restarts emulation from snapshots of the device’s physical
state after frame reception. As it brings fuzzing speed to an
unprecedented level, it can be attached to complex operating
systems and find full-stack bugs.
Emulation allows understanding RCE vulnerabilities that
do not immediately cause a crash but are potentially dan-
gerous. The findings covered in this paper got us in contact
with further chip manufacturers, confirming that there is high
interest in and awareness of technologies that allow testing
wireless implementations and help fixing vulnerabilities.
The vulnerability patching issues of Broadcom Bluetooth
chips highlight the importance of building sustainable and
secure update mechanisms. We found the overall responsi-
ble disclosure process quite alarming. One of our attacks,
CVE-2019-11516, was internally discovered by Broadcom in
February 2018, but when we informed them about our find-
ings in April 2019, our PoC was working on all Broadcom
chips we had access to. Usually, until a Bluetooth chip be-
comes available on off-the-shelf devices, it is at least one year
old. Due to the patching mechanism constraints and ease of
analyzing patches, Broadcom cannot patch all vulnerabilities
on older chips. Each patch comes with a high risk of leaking
a vulnerability. Despite monthly contact with Samsung, a fix
for CVE-2019-11516 took until mid September 2019 on the
Samsung Galaxy S8, which is comparably well-supported.
Despite failing to fix Bluetooth firmware vulnerabilities,
mobile operating systems integrate Bluetooth into critical
components. With the overall presence of Bluetooth, even
worms spreading wirelessly become feasible. Recent mobile
operating systems do not reset and disable Bluetooth properly,
even though they suggest to users that they do. The advice to
turn off Bluetooth when not needed is insufficient. Always
being connected is a very alarming trend regarding over-the-
air attacks. Ideally, this trend can be reversed in the future,
thus, giving back control over wireless technologies to the
users.
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